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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
V.
)
)
)
)
BRADY LAWSON COKER,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
STATE OF IDAHO,

NOS. 47352-2019, 47353-2019,
47354-2019 & 47355-2019
KOOTENAI COUNTY
NOS. CR-2014-2867, CR-2014-7240,
CR-2014-11700 & CR28-18-10607
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In this consolidated appeal, Mr. Coker appeals from the district court's order
relinquishing jurisdiction. In Supreme Court Docket No. 47355, he asserts the district court
abused its discretion when it imposed a sentence of five years fixed, along with a $50,000 fine,
following Mr. Coker's plea of guilty to one count of witness intimidation.

Additionally, in

Supreme Court Docket Nos. 47352, 47353, 47354, and 47355, Mr. Coker asserts the district
court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Supreme Court Docket Nos. 47352-2019 (district court case number CR 2014-2867),
47353-2019 (district court case number CR-2014-7240), 47354-2019 (district court case number
CR-2014-11700), and 47355-2019 (district court case number CR28-18-10607), have been
consolidated for appellate purposes. (R., p.156.) 1
In July of 2018, police responded to a report of a battery that occurred between
Mr. Coker and his girlfriend, Madison Hall. (Presentence Report (PSI), p.6.)2 Ms. Hall told the
responding officer that, when she told Mr. Coker that she did not want to spend the night at his
house, "he became irate and took [her] keys from the ignition and threw them in the bushes."
(PSI, p.6.) She said when she got out of her truck to look for them, Mr. Coker followed her
around yelling at her, and when she went to look for a spare key in the bed of the truck,
Mr. Coker, "grabbed her purse strap, which was wrapped around her neck and shoulder. He
pulled her out of the truck, and she landed on her back on the ground."

(PSI, p.6.)

She

explained that Mr. Coker continued pushing her into his house even though she said she wanted
to leave. (PSI, p.6.) She stated that he then put his hands on her throat and squeezed for about
two seconds. (PSI, p.6.) When the couple went to Mr. Coker's bedroom, he told Ms. Hall to
take off her clothes, and when she refused, "he grabbed her and forced her clothing off her
body." (PSI, p.7.) Ms. Hall said she continued to tell Mr. Coker she wanted to leave, but he
would not let her go. (PSI, p.7.) The following morning, she told Mr. Coker she had to go to
work, and she stated that she told Mr. Coker she loved him so he would let her go and not "go
off on her again." (PSI, p. 7.)

1
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All citations to the Clerk's Record refer to the 158-page electronic document.
All citations to the PSI refer to the 139-page electronic document.
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Subsequently, the State charged Mr. Coker with one count of attempted strangulation,
one count of second-degree kidnapping, and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.11-13.)
Mr. Coker was later released on bail but failed to appear at a preliminary hearing status
conference, and the magistrate court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. (R., p.35.) After he
was arrested, the magistrate court held a preliminary hearing, but Ms. Hall did not appear.
(R., p.41.) The State requested a continuance and alleged that Mr. Coker was making calls to
discourage Ms. Hall from attending the hearing.

(R., p.41.)

amended complaint adding a charge of witness intimidation.

Thereafter, the State filed an
(R., pp.46-48.)

Mr. Coker

subsequently waived his right to a preliminary hearing, and the State charged him, by
Information, with one count of attempted strangulation, one count of second-degree kidnapping,
one count of witness intimidation, and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.53-56.) The
State alleged that Mr. Coker committed the offense of witness intimidation by, among other
things, telling others to contact Ms. Hall to "make sure she is still on his side and/or to make sure
she doesn't show up for court and/or to tell her that he loves her and/or to tell the
prosecution/police it was all a lie; and/or trying to convince Madison Hall not to testify against
him .... " (R., p.55.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Coker pied guilty to one count of misdemeanor
domestic violence, one felony count of intimidating a witness, and one misdemeanor count of
violating a no contact order. (R., pp.57, 60.) He also admitted to violating his probation in three
prior cases for which he was on probation at the time of the offense.

(R., pp.58-59.)

In

exchange, the State agreed to file an amended information and not pursue the persistent violator
enhancement. (R., pp.57-63.)
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At the joint sentencing/probation violation disposition hearing, the district court revoked
probation in the prior cases in which Mr. Coker pled guilty to criminal possession of a financial
transaction, bribery, and concealment of evidence; it then executed those underlying sentences.
(Tr., p.24, Ls.10-24.) 3 For the witness intimidation case, it imposed a sentence of five years
fixed, as well as a $50,000 fme, and it ordered that the sentence run consecutive to the sentences
in the prior cases. (Tr., p.24, L.25 - p.25, L.7; R, pp.96-99.) It retained jurisdiction "only to see
if [Mr. Coker] could get into Mental Health Court," and it said it would not consider probation
unless Mr. Coker's rider was "essentially perfect." (Tr., p.25, Ls.8-11.)
Mr. Coker successfully completed the rider, and the Idaho Department of Correction
recommended that he be placed on probation. (PSI, p.99.) At the rider review hearing, the State
noted that Mr. Coker received some disciplinary warnings on the rider, and thus recommended
that the district court relinquish its jurisdiction and execute the underlying sentences. (Tr., p.31,
Ls.2-24.) Mr. Coker's counsel pointed out that Mr. Coker made excellent progress on the rider
and requested that the district court place Mr. Coker on probation, so he could fmish the
screening process for Mental Health Court.

(Tr., p.35, L.12 - p.36, L.17, p.41, Ls.10-14.)

Nevertheless, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and executed Mr. Coker's sentences.
(Tr., p.42, L.24-p.43, L.21; R., pp.111-13.) Mr. Coker filed a notice of appeal timely from the
district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp.123-25.)
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All citations to the transcript refer to the 17-page electronic document. There are four pages
contained on each of the 17 pages, and the citations here refer to those individual pages.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence of five years fixed,
and a fine of $50,000, following Mr. Coker's plea of guilty to one count of witness
intimidation?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction instead of
placing Mr. Coker on probation after his rider?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Sentence Of Five Years Fixed, And
A Fine of$50,000, Following Mr. Coker's Plea Of Guilty To One Count Of Witness
Intimidation
Given the facts of this case, Mr. Coker's sentence of five years fixed, along with a
$50,000 fine, is excessive because it is not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. When
there is a claim that the sentencing court imposed an excessive sentence, this Court will conduct
"an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender and the protection of the public interest." State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho
1, 8 (2016). In such a review, the Court "considers the entire length of the sentence under an
abuse of discretion standard." Id. An appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry when an
exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal. It considers whether the trial court: "(1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion;
(3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it;
and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho
856, 863 (2018).
The fourth factor is the most important for sentencing purposes, and the one that is absent
in this case. "When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, 'the most fundamental
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requirement is reasonableness."' McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8 (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho
606, 608 (1991)). Unless it appears that the length of the sentence is "necessary to accomplish
the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution," the sentence is unreasonable. Id. When a sentence is
excessive "considering any view of the facts," because it is not necessary to achieve these goals,
it is unreasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion. Id.
There are several facts that illustrate why Mr. Coker's sentence is excessive under any
view of the facts.

First, Mr. Coker has significant mental health issues. The psychological

evaluation filed in this case showed that Mr. Coker was "subject to manic episodes of an
expansive and hostile character . . . ."

(PSI, p.57.) It also revealed that Mr. Coker has a

"significant mental disorder, as well as a clear history of substance abuse and dependence."
(PSI, p.57.) Similarly, the evaluation noted that Mr. Coker "evidenced rather clear depressive
symptoms, which include fatigue, weakness, sleep disturbance, and appetite disturbance." (PSI,
p.57.) The evaluation also noted that Mr. Coker had "symptoms of anxiety in the form of
sweating (not due to heat), feeling tense, and having impaired concentration." (PSI, p.57.)
The evaluation went on to explain that Mr. Coker "evidences rather significant emotional
dyscontrol, with frequently changing moods, and being erratic emotionally." (PSI, p.58.) It also
stated that Mr. Coker "presents as bipolar disordered, with his history of depressive episodes, as
well as, clear manic or hypomanic episodes." (PSI, p.58.) Additionally, it stated that Mr. Coker
"presents with what would appear to be a substance-induced psychotic disorder." (PSI, p.58.)
Given these severe symptoms, the evaluator concluded that Mr. Coker was "clearly in need of
ongoing mental health treatment," and he was "in need of being medically assessed for use of an
antidepressant medication .... " (PSI, p.58.) Finally, the evaluator diagnosed Mr. Coker with
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recurrent and severe "Major Depression," an "Unspecified Personality Disorder," a "Bipolar
Disorder," and a "Generalized Anxiety Disorder." (PSI, p.58.) This was mitigating information
that should have been considered by the district court in reaching its sentencing decision.
State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391 (1994) ("Idaho Code § 19-2523, which requires that the
trial court consider the defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor, was an integral part of
the legislature's repeal of mental condition as a defense.").
However, the district court disregarded this mitigating information, and indeed imposed
the maximum sentence allowed for this offense. (See LC. §§ 18-2604 and 18-112.) At the
sentencing hearing, it said, "Your mental health diagnosis doesn't have anything to do with why
you're here." (Tr., p.22, Ls.24-25.) It then said to Mr. Coker, "You're not running around the
park buck naked because you're psychotic. You're making horribly bad decisions every single
day, and that doesn't have anything to do with your mental health does it?" (Tr., p.22, L.25 p.23, L.4.) When Mr. Coker attempted to reply, the district court cut him off and said, "When
are you going to grow up and be a man and admit what you need to admit?" (Tr., p.23, Ls.7-8.)
It then told Mr. Coker, "I want you to grow a pair and be a man and tell me whether I'm wrong
or right." (Tr., p.23, Ls.9-11.)
Mr. Coker has also struggled with substance abuse issues for many years. (PSI, pp.8-9.)
He acknowledged that he had a problem with substance abuse and needed treatment. (PSI, p.35.)
And the psychological evaluator concluded that he had a "clear history of substance abuse and
dependence," and diagnosed him with both opioid and alcohol dependence. (PSI, pp.57-58.)
This is another recognized mitigating factor. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982) (reducing
defendant's sentence, in part, because "the trial court did not give proper consideration of the
defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime [the
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defendant had been drinking at the time of the offense] and the suggested alternatives for treating
the problem").
Mr. Coker asserts that imposing the maximum sentence allowed in this case was an
abuse of discretion because the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards when it failed to consider Mr. Coker's mental health and substance abuse problems as
mitigating factors.

He also submits the district court failed to reach its sentencing decision

through an exercise of reason because the sentencing transcript clearly shows that the court based
its decision, at least in part, on its animosity towards Mr. Coker as opposed to the nature of the
offense. The maximum sentence allowed in this case-particularly the $50,000 fine-was not
necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing in this case, and indeed was not reasonable in light
of the facts of the case, and the mitigating information in the case.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Instead Of Placing
Mr. Coker On Probation After His Rider
Mr. Coker's rider was very successful; this was reflected at multiple points in the APSI.
Despite all of the case manager's positive comments, however, the district court relinquished its
jurisdiction and sent Mr. Coker to prison. This decision devalued Mr. Coker's efforts on the
rider, and disregarded how those efforts demonstrated his rehabilitative potential and suitability
for probation.
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter of discretion for the court. State v.
Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-89 (Ct. App. 2010). "Where the trial court has exercised its

discretion after careful consideration of relevant factual circumstances and principles of law,
without arbitrary disregard for such facts and principles of justice, the reviewing court will not
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disturb the action without a clear showing of abuse of discretion." Deford v. State, 105 Idaho
865, 868 (1983). In determining whether a court abused its discretion, the appellate court will
determine whether the trial court: "(l) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
The purpose of retaining jurisdiction is to evaluate the offender's potential for
rehabilitation and suitability for probation.

State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 161 (2010);

State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911, 915 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The primary purpose of the

retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial court to gain additional information regarding
the defendant's rehabilitative potential and suitability for probation."). This illustrates that a
district court should not retain jurisdiction in the first place if it does not intend to engage in a
careful analysis of these factors when a defendant completes a rider. This would constitute a
clear abuse of discretion because it would not be consistent with applicable legal standards, and
it would demonstrate an arbitrary disregard for the facts regarding a defendant's performance on
a rider. Yet that is precisely what happened in this case.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court warned Mr. Coker that it would not consider
probation unless he got into Mental Health Court and "put together a flawless rider." (Tr., p.25,
p.25, Ls.19-22.) Mr. Coker received some disciplinary warnings during his rider (PSI, pp.10102.) However, he also demonstrated that he had turned a comer, and he was well suited for
probation. For example, his case manager stated that Mr. Coker "was able to address some of his
criminogenic thinking patterns, attitudes, and beliefs and use his problem-solving and social
skills to address these errors in thinking. He addressed his peers respectfully and, for the most
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part, he did very well, which is in contrast to his behavior when he first arrived in the program."
(PSI, p.102 (emphasis added)). Similarly, his case manager wrote that Mr. Coker, "appeared to
make a 180 degree tum around. He was a pleasant group participant. He appeared to put a lot of
work into his assignments and seemed to be serious about how his former choices ... negatively
impacted his life." (PSI, p.102.) His case manager also noted that Mr. Coker "was an excellent
group member overall, and an integral part of his group's final project." (PSI, p.102.) With
respect to his attitude, the case manager wrote, "Mr. Coker seems to have come a long way from
when he first started the group, as he is very open to feedback at this time."

(PSI, p.103

(emphasis added)).
Mr. Coker also successfully completed the Aggression Replacement Training program,
and his case manager explained he "did a great job identifying his external and internal triggers
and identifying his reminders. He did a good job on the rest of the chain. Mr. Coker was an
active participant in the Moral Reasoning portion. He offered his thoughts when appropriate and
tended to make decisions that considered how he or his loved ones would be affected." (PSI,
p.103.) She went on to write, "Mr. Coker made tremendous progress over the course of this
program. His entire method of thinking has changed from a self-centered approach to an otherscentered approach." (PSI, p.103 (emphasis added)). Mr. Coker also completed his GED during
his rider, and he completed a Career Plan. (PSI, p.103.)
In sum, the case manager stated, "Although Mr. Coker broke rules while on his 'Rider'
program, overall, he seems to have shown an ability to learn from previous problems and has not
been a significant disciplinary problem. In fact, several staff members have commented that he
appears to have made substantial progress, especially as far as his attitude is concerned." (PSI,
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p.102.) Therefore, the case manager recommended that the district court place Mr. Coker on
probation. (PSI, p.105.)
All of these comments reflected very positively on Mr. Coker's rehabilitative potential,
suitability for probation, and the changes he made while on the program.

But there is no

indication the district court was genuinely interested in those things. In fact, it mentioned none
of these positive comments at the rider review hearing. (Tr., p.42, L.23 - p.45, L.9.) It certainly
had the discretion to determine, after the completion of the rider, whether Mr. Coker was ready
for probation, but it had to make that determination through an exercise of reason, not arbitrary
action, and it had to give genuine consideration to the Department of Corrections
recommendation for probation.
However, the district court did not genuinely consider the recommendation made by the
Department of Corrections. It also failed to adequately consider everything Mr. Coker
accomplished on the rider, and whether he was ready for probation.

Instead, it focused

exclusively on Mr. Coker's disciplinary issues and the things he did not do.

Mr. Coker's

performance on the rider showed that he made genuine efforts to change, and he did indeed
change dramatically. That is the conclusion the district court should have reached based on a
sincere and genuine evaluation of his progress. As such, the district court abused its discretion
when it relinquished jurisdiction because it did not act consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it, and it did not reach its decision to relinquish
jurisdiction through an exercise of reason.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Coker respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate, or remand the case for a new sentencing hearing in front of a different district court
judge. Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate the district court's order relinquishing
jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court.
DATED this 1st day of April, 2020.

/ s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of April, 2020, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Coker
EVAN A. COKER
Administrative Assistant
RPA/eas
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